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This paper tackles the issue of the welfare desirability of
downstream integration versus separation when facing the problem
of socially valuable information acquisition on the upstream cost
in regulated network industries. I consider an upstream natural
monopoly with cost uncertainty, regulated through an access price
cap mechanism, and a downstream unregulated Cournot competi-
tion. Cost information improves the performance of the regulatory
mechanism but it can only be acquired by the monopolist; the
information acquisition is unobservable. I show that the access
price cap mechanism provides a vertically integrated firm with
greater incentives to acquire information and this favours
integration. [JEL Classification: D82; D83; L5]
Questo saggio analizza come il problema dell’acquisizione di
informazioni sul costo del mercato a monte in un industria a re-
te regolamentata influenza la desiderabilità della integrazione ver-
ticale. Si considera un monopolio naturale a monte con incertez-
za sui costi, regolamentato con un meccanismo di access price
cap, e un mercato a valle non regolamentato con concorrenza al-
la Cournot. L’informazione sui costi è socialmente desiderabile, ma
può essere acquistata solo dal monopolista; l’acquisizione d’infor-
mazioni non è osservabile. Si dimostra che il meccanismo dell’ac-
cess price cap fornisce maggiori incentivi all’impresa ad acquisire
informazioni in un industria verticalmente integrata rispetto ad
un’industria separata.
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1. - Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the regulated network industries
in Europe and in the United States have been affected by very
important regulatory reforms, concerning both their structural
organization and the degree of price regulation. Indeed, during
the 1980s and the 1990s, the telecommunications and electricity
industries were targeted for the structural separation of natural
monopolistic segments (essential facilities) from potentially com-
petitive businesses. Moreover, they underwent a partial deregu-
lation process aimed at favouring service-based competition.
However, the persistence of essential facilities and the continuing
dominance of the incumbents seem to suggest that total deregu-
lation is unrealistic at this stage, and that policy makers should
instead concern themselves with the industrial structure of the
regulated network industries and the type of access price
regulatory mechanisms used1.
In network industries characterized by a regulated upstream
naturally monopolistic sector and a downstream unregulated
sector, the main advantages of vertical integration, as highlighted
by economic literature, are the efficiency gains arising from the
exploitation of economies of scope, the reduction in downstream
costs and the coordination between investments in upstream and
downstream segments2.
However, downstream integration can reduce downstream
competition on account of the incentives of an integrated firm to
impose costs on its downstream rivals through price-discri-
mination and input quality deterioration.
According to an increasingly accepted view, widely-adopted
policies, such as wholesale access price regulation and accounting
separation, are not sufficient on their own to reduce the
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1 VOGELSANG I. (2002) and PEITZ M. (2003), among others, have underlined
that the opening up to competition of some network industry segments has not
eliminated the need for regulation but only changed the nature of regulation.
2 See VICKERS J. (1995); KWOKA J.E. (2002); MICHAELS R.J. (2004) and
ARMSTRONG M. - SAPPINGTON D. (2007). Further references are in IOSSA E. -
STROFFOLINI F. (2007).
incumbent’s discriminating behaviour3. Indeed, because of the
regulator’s lack of information on the upstream costs, the
integrated upstream monopolist has an incentive to exaggerate its
cost to convince the regulator to set a higher access price (Vickers,
1995). In the case of the adoption of accounting separation –
entailing separate profit statements and balance sheets for
downstream and upstream activities – this could reduce the
incumbent’s price discrimination against its downstream rivals,
but not access quality discrimination.
These arguments would seem to favour the adoption of
structural measures able to reduce the upstream monopolist’s
incentives to restrict competition, such as the ownership separa-
tion of potentially competitive activities from the bottleneck
segment.
This drastic irreversible measure, however, could entail high
social costs in industries, such as telecommunications, where the
economies of scope are very pronounced and there are growing
opportunities for those innovations which require investment
coordination4. In the electricity industry, on the other hand, the
technical characteristics require an extremely close minute-by
minute coordination between generation and transmission which
is likely to be threatened by the separation of the two activities5.
To reduce the social costs of ownership separation and favour
downstream competition, the attention of the European policy
operators has moved towards intermediate forms of separation
midway between ownership separation and accounting separation
F. STROFFOLINI
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3 In the absence of strong infrastructure competition the UK Communications
Regulator, OFCOM (2005), has highlighted that, even with regulatory safeguards in
place, access regulation has not succeeded in solving the problems of bottlenecks
and discriminatory behaviour over the last 20 years. This view is supported by
CAVE M. (2006).
4 See COWAN S. (2001); OFTEL (2001) and OECD (2001) for an in-depth
discussion.
5 In the electricity industry consumers are supplied with electrical energy
through a common network without any physical transmission of electricity from
a generator to a specific consumer. The property of electricity transmission together
with the demand insensitivity to price and the non storability of electricity require
that a balance between supply and demand be maintained continuously throughout
the system; otherwise non-localized power outages occur which could threaten the
stability of the entire system.
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such as functional separation6. This requires a vertically integrated
operator to establish operationally discrete business divisions by
separating the business processes involved in the production of
services which use non-replicable assets from those in other retail
and wholesale products7. Functional separation may be accom-
panied by managerial incentives related to divisional performances
rather than to the profits of the whole industry in order to prevent
the incumbent’s price discrimination against downstream
competitors. However, divorcing the incentives of upstream and
downstream managers might result in insufficient investments in
maintenance and innovative technologies, which require
coordination between upstream and downstream activities, with
a consequent negative effect on the input quality8.
The conclusion of the above analysis is that the proper
measure of any separation remedy is not the extent to which it
promotes competition, but rather the extent to which it enhances
consumer welfare. To this end, all benefits and costs should be
carefully taken into account.
This paper tackles the issue of the welfare desirability of
downstream integration versus separation when facing the
problem of socially valuable information acquisition on the
uncertain upstream cost in network industries which are regulated
through an access price cap mechanism.
The access price cap regulatory mechanism only sets the
maximum price (cap) that the upstream monopolist is allowed to
charge for each network element, leaving price discretion below
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6 See OECD (2001) for a discussion of other approaches to separation.
7 Functional separation can entail separation of functions, separation of
employees, limits to the transmission of information between units, financial
separation (ERG, 2007).
8 Indeed, in the UK, when evaluating the first results of the OpenReach
undertaking – the bottleneck unit – Ofcom identified a reduction in the quality of
certain products. This concern is also shared by the European Commission which
requires, in order that functional separation be effective, the assessment of
restrictive conditions mainly concerning the impact on incumbent’s incentives to
invest (EU, Review of the 2002 Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications and Services, 2007). Besides, according to the European
Commission, functional separation does not eliminate the need for access price
regulation (incorporated in section 9-13 of the Directive on Access and
Interconnection, 2002).
it9. The wide use of this mechanism is supported by the common
view that the regulated upstream monopolist has information on
costs which are unaccessible to the regulator. Therefore, price
discretion below the cap is socially desirable to the extent that it
allows the regulated firm to use the information it has more
efficiently. In some network industries, however, the estimate of
the cost realizations can be expensive for the regulated firm itself
and the incentives to acquire information may vary according to
the industry structure. An accurate estimate of cost conditions is
of value to the regulator as it improves the performance of the
access price cap mechanism and may enhance the efficiency of
the downstream market; in this case, a welfare loss arises if the
firm’s incentives to estimate cost conditions prove to be
inadequate.
This paper will prove that, under imperfect downstream
competition, the upstream monopolist has a greater incentive to
acquire socially valuable information on the uncertain upstream
cost when she is allowed to produce in the downstream market,
as under integration, than when she is excluded from it, and that
this favours integration10.
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9 In network industries characterized by rapid technological changes, the use
of an access price cap mechanism which bases the cap on the historical cost of
network (as established by AGCOM, the Italian Communications Regulatory Agency)
is likely to be more appropriate than “forward looking” cost rules (such as LRIC
and the TLRIC) which base the prices of the unbundled network elements on the
current cost of re-building facilities to provide the existing service, using the best
available technology. The main criticism to these rules is that they may prevent
the incumbent from efficiently recovering sunk costs, thereby discouraging
investments with respect to access prices based on the historical cost of the
network. See LITTLECHILD S. (2003); GUTHRIE G. et AL. (2006) and PINDYCK R.S.
(2007).
10 The paper considers a unitary internal organization of the firm where the
owner coincides with the manager and separation refers to ownership separation.
As I will highlight in note 15 on page 7, the result holds in the case of functional
separation when it is accompanied by managerial incentives related to unit
performances rather than to the performance of the industry.
It is worth underlining that the result of the paper does not hold under perfect
downstream competition (price competition). However, the assumption of
imperfect downstream competition is not restrictive. Indeed, under price
competition the value to the upstream monopolist of a unit of output directly sold
to consumers in the downstream market is equal to the value of a unit of output
sold indirectly through selling the essential input to her downstream rivals
(assuming equal efficiency in the downstream market). But for this reason, under
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Before describing the model, I would like to explain briefly
why a problem of information acquisition on costs may arise in
network industries such as electricity and telecommunications.
Let us consider the electricity sector. Information on
transmission costs is useful to set the access prices – the unit
charges for each interconnection point on the grid – which are
crucial for the smooth operating of the transmission network in
order to avoid any imbalance in demand and supply. However, the
transmission costs are not easily predictable, since uncertainty
arises mainly over the costs of the transmission constraints, i.e.
the congestion costs and the costs of replacing the power lost
during transmission (see Armstrong et al., 1994; Newbery, 2000
for an in-depth analysis). Both these costs depend on the variation
in demand and supply at each node which, in turn, depends on
the distribution of consumer types (residential versus industrial)
and on the technological changes which affect the number of firms
which use electricity as their input. An assessment of transmission
costs, therefore, may require expensive estimates of the
geographical pattern of demand and supply in addition to a
forecast of technological changes.
In the telecommunications industry, information on the cost
of the essential input is socially valuable in all those cases it can
efficiently affect the downstream output11. The measurement of
the economic costs of network elements, however, is a difficult
undertaking for the firm itself on account of the forward-looking
nature of these costs which require a costly prediction of the
evolution of technological and demographical characteristics12.
Indeed, the rapid technological changes characterizing the
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price competition, the upstream monopolist would have no incentive to
discriminate against her rivals and, therefore, there would be no economic
justification for the imposition of ownership (and functional) separation. Hence,
the welfare comparison between integration and separation, which is the aim of
the paper, would be meaningless under the assumption of price competition.
11 In the telecommunications industry, customer access to the network is
provided through the local loop and the switching. The local loop is the copper
wire connecting the end-user to the first switch and telecommunications switches
are input-output devices that select the transmission paths that a given call will
take throughout the network.
12 See VOGELSANG I. (2003) for a discussion on this issue.
telecommunications industry reduce the prices of some network
elements and provide new generation equipment, which may make
it uneconomical to exploit the existing assets13. On the other hand,
technological innovations generate new services which may
require different equipment with respect to standard services (for
example, new innovation services and standard services require
different switches and transmission facilities). The above two
reasons may well cause a change in the cost of network equipment
over time, both in the sense of the replacement cost and the user
cost of existing equipment.
Besides, the choice of the equipment depends on the forecast
of the future usage of the elements. In turn, the forecasts
themselves depend on local demographic considerations such as
the population growth, the density of the area, the evolution of
the business/residential mix.
The model presented in this paper is built on Iossa and
Stroffolini (2007) who also investigate the effects of information
acquisition on the welfare desirability of vertical integration, but
with two important differences with respect to the present
analysis: in their paper, the information acquisition concerns an
uncertain demand in the downstream market and the access price
is regulated through an optimal mechanism.
I will consider a network industry characterized by an
upstream natural monopoly with cost uncertainty, regulated
through an access price cap mechanism, and an unregulated
downstream market with Cournot competition, producing a
homogeneous good14. The cost of the essential input is random
and the cost realizations can be interpreted as the result of
technological changes; they can also reflect the distribution of
demographic characteristics (such as mix of residential/business
consumers, geographical location, density of the area). I will
assume that only the upstream monopolist has the necessary
F. STROFFOLINI
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13 This occurs when the operating cost of the old asset is greater than the
rental cost of new generation equipment.
14 My model is better suited to the telecommunications industry, where the
regulated upstream market is the local loop and the unregulated downstream
market is the long distance market.
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know-how to acquire information on the upstream cost, while the
information acquisition is prohibitively costly for the regulator
and the downstream firms. The regulator is only concerned about
consumer welfare and the acquisition of information on the
upstream cost is valuable to the regulator to the extent that it can
affect the firms’ output choice in the downstream market. The
regulator knows the cost of acquiring information but he cannot
observe the process of information acquisition which means that
he cannot simply instruct the firm to acquire information. Within
this context, I will compare two industrial structures: integration,
where the upstream monopolist is integrated with a downstream
firm, and (ownership) separation, where the upstream firm does
not operate in the downstream market. In both cases only two
firms produce in the downstream market.
First, I will analyze the incentives to acquire information on
the upstream cost, under integration and separation, when the
access price cap is designed for the case of asymmetric
information. I will show that integration gives the upstream
monopolist a greater incentive to acquire socially valuable infor-
mation compared to separation. This can be explained as follows.
Under separation, information on the upstream cost is valuable
to the upstream monopolist only to the extent that it allows her
to charge the monopoly access price whenever it lies below the
access price cap15. This implies that the gains from acquiring
information depend on the probability that favourable
technological conditions make the monopoly access price lower
than the access price cap. On the contrary, when the upstream
monopolist is allowed to produce in the downstream market, as
under integration, she can use the information on the upstream
cost to adjust her output in the downstream market accordingly,
whatever the actual cost.
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15 This also occurs under functional separation when it is accompanied by
managerial incentives related to the performance of the unit rather than to the
performance of the whole industry. In this case, the upstream manager cannot
appropriate downstream profits and, therefore, the information is valuable to her
only if it can be used to increase the expected access profits, i.e. for values of cost
which make the monopoly access price lower than the cap.
Moreover, I will show that the very fact that the information
remains private makes it profitable for the upstream monopolist,
under integration, to charge the access price cap even when it lies
above the monopoly access price.
When the cost of acquiring information is greater than the
value of information to the upstream monopolist, and the access
price cap is the only regulatory instrument, higher incentives to
acquire information can only be provided by increasing the overall
level of the price cap in order to increase the firm’s profits.
I will show that an increase in the access price cap raises the
upstream monopolist’s value of information under separation but
not under integration. This is due to the fact that the integrated
upstream monopolist always charges the access price cap, both
when she acquires information and when she does not; therefore,
the value of information is independent of the level of the access
price cap. On the contrary, under separation, the higher the access
price cap, the greater the probability that the informed upstream
monopolist will charge the monopoly access price and, therefore,
the greater the value of information.
It follows that, when the cost of acquiring information is
sufficiently high, the integrated upstream monopolist chooses to
remain ignorant and sets its output on the basis of the expected
value of the upstream cost; hence the welfare gains arising from
the variability of industry output are lost. Instead, under
separation, a trade-off occurs. On the one hand, inducing infor-
mation acquisition makes it possible to realize the welfare gains
arising from the potential reduction of the access price. On the
other hand, inducing information acquisition is welfare costly
because it requires an increase in the access price cap which
reduces the output on the range where the access price cap is
binding. The greater the information acquisition cost, the greater
the increase required in the access price cap, the less likely it is
that inducing information acquisition will be optimal under
separation.
On the basis of the above results, I will show that there is an
entire range of information acquisition costs where, under
integration, the access price cap mechanism designed for the case
F. STROFFOLINI
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of asymmetric information naturally gives the monopolist an
incentive to acquire information, whereas, under separation, the
regulator has to increase the level of the cap to induce information
acquisition. Therefore, over this range, the information acquisition
problem generates a welfare loss under separation but not under
integration.
However, when the cost of acquiring information increases, a
welfare loss occurs under integration as well, due to the lack of
socially valuable information. As a consequence, there might be a
range of information acquisition costs where the access price cap
mechanism induces information acquisition under separation but
not under integration. I will argue that this could occur in tho-
se network industries where the demand and technological cha-
racteristics prevent the access price cap mechanism from affecting
the price discriminating behaviour of an integrated upstream
monopolist, whatever the actual value of the cost; namely, an
integrated industry become an unregulated monopoly. In these
cases, with the access price cap as the only regulatory instrument,
the upstream monopolist would not be allowed to produce in the
downstream market, i.e., integration would never occur.
The conclusion is that in network industries where the access
price cap mechanism, under asymmetric information, is effective
in regulating an integrated upstream monopolist, the information
acquisition problem is likely to increase the welfare desirability of
integration with respect to separation.
This paper is related to the literature on vertical integration
and on access price regulation (see Laffont and Tirole, 1994, 1996,
2000; Armstrong et al., 1996; Armstrong, 2002 and Vogelsang,
2003, for a comprehensive overview of access price theory and
practice in the telecommunications industry; see Riechmann,
2000, for a theoretical and empirical analysis of the strategic
pricing effects of access price cap regulation in the electricity
industry). This paper also refers to the literature on information
acquisition, which has investigated the impact of information
acquisition on the performance of regulatory mechanisms (see, for
example, Cremer et al., 1998, for an analysis of optimal regulation
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and, in particular, Iossa and Stroffolini, 2002, for an analysis of
price cap regulation)16.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
outlines the model (section 2.1); it then derives the equilibrium
outputs under Cournot competition and analyzes the choice of the
access price charged by the upstream monopolist, under integra-
tion (section 2.2) and separation (section 2.3); it further analyzes
the regulator’s choice of the access price cap (section 2.4). Section
3 investigates the performance of the access price cap mechanism
in the presence of the problem of information acquisition under
integration (section 3.1) and separation (section 3.2); it then
analyzes the impact of the information acquisition problem on the
welfare comparison between integration and separation (section
3.3). Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs missing from the
main paper are in the Appendix.
2. - Access Price Cap Mechanisms
2.1 The Model
In this paper, a very simple analytical framework is used in
which a regulated upstream monopolist sells network access to
downstream firm (s) in a retail market characterized as an
unregulated duopoly with Cournot competition and homogeneous
product.
Two industrial structures are considered: integration (I) and
separation (S); I indicates a situation where the upstream
monopolist is allowed to produce, through a subsidiary, also in
the downstream market while under S this is not permitted. The
number of firms in the downstream market is fixed and equal to
two in both industrial structures; I will assume that only one firm,
apart from the incumbent’s subsidiary, knows the technology
required to produce the output. Thus, the difference between the
F. STROFFOLINI
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see IOSSA E. - STROFFOLINI F. (2007).
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two industrial structures is merely that under S the downstream
firm which was the subsidiary of the upstream monopolist in the
final market becomes independent. This makes it possible to
highlight the effects of information issues on the comparison
between I and S has no qualitative impact on the results.
The marginal cost of the essential input is c = β, where β is
a parameter of adverse selection with β ∈ [β, β¯¯ ]; it has density
function f(β) and distribution function F(β) which are common
knowledge; β0 and σ2 denote the mean value and the variance of
the distribution of β, respectively. The realizations of β can be
interpreted as the result of technological changes; they can also
reflect the distribution of demographic characteristics (such as
mix of residential/ business consumers, geographical location,
density of the area). The upstream monopolist (she) can observe
at some cost K ≥ 0 the true realization of β, while information
acquisition is prohibitively costly for the regulator (he) and
downstream firms. I will assume that the regulator knows the
value of K but cannot observe the information acquisition process;
he only observes the access price.
The upstream market is regulated through an access price cap
mechanism with downward flexibility which sets an upper bound
on the price that the upstream monopolist can charge for the
essential input sold to downstream firms. Hereafter, let ACI denote
the access price cap regulatory mechanism under I and ACS the
regulatory mechanism under S.
The downstream market is characterized by a linear inverse
demand function: P(Q) = d – Q. For the sake of simplicity, it is
assumed that the technology used to produce the downstream
output, which is the same under both industrial structures, only
requires the essential facility17. Therefore, the cost of producing
the final good is the marginal cost of producing the essential input
for the integrated upstream monopolist, since the access price paid
by her subsidiary is merely an internal transfer, while for the
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17 I will assume away efficiency gains arising from integration and assume
that the fixed cost of entering the downstream market is equal for each firm and
normalized to zero. These assumptions help to focus attention on the effects that
information acquisition issues have on the welfare comparison between I and S.
downstream firm the cost of producing the final good is the
regulated access price.
Consider now the payoff of the firms, net of the information-
acquisition cost.
Under I the profit function of the upstream monopolist is
(1)
where QI = q
M + qR, and qM and qR denote the quantity produced
by the upstream monopolist and the rival firm in the downstream
market, respectively; aI denotes the access price paid by the rival.
The profit function of the rival is
(2)
Under S, the profit function of the upstream monopolist is
given by
(3)
where QS = 2qS and qS denotes the quantity produced by a
downstream firm; aS denotes the access price paid by the
downstream firms and the downstream firms profit is
(4)
The regulator maximizes, both under I and under S, the
expected net consumer surplus; denoting by S(Qh) the gross
consumer surplus with S = Ph and S” < 0 the regulator’s objective
function is given by18
(5)
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18 The exclusion of any concern about the firm’s profits on the part of the
regulator can be justified by the fact that, in industries characterized by cost
uncertainty, a price cap mechanism usually allows the firm to make high profits.
However, this assumption is not restrictive (see note 27).
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The timing of the game is the following. 1) Nature chooses β;
2) the regulator sets the access price cap under ACI and ACS; 3)
the upstream monopolist decides whether to acquire information
on the cost parameter β by investing K, and, if she does, observes
β; 4) the upstream monopolist decides whether to accept the
regulatory mechanism and, if she does, chooses the access price;
5) firms in the downstream market simultaneously choose their
quantities and the access prices are paid.
The game will be solved, both under I and under S through
backward induction, i.e., first by finding the equilibrium at the
last stage of the game and then at the previous stages. This
analysis begins with the computation of the downstream
equilibrium outputs resulting from Cournot competition as a
function of the access price charged by the upstream monopolist;
then, using these results, I will derive the access price charged by
the upstream monopolist. Finally, the access price cap solving the
regulator’s problem will be determined.
2.2 Integration
Let , with , denote the access 
price charged by the upstream monopolist under information
acquisition, where amI(β) is the monopoly access price and A¯¯I is
the access price cap. It is worth noticing that if the upstream
monopolist chooses the monopoly access price, her rival in the
downstream market can deduce the true realization of β from the
access price19. It follows that the upstream monopolist, in
choosing the monopoly access price, has to take into account the
equilibrium outputs which would arise from Cournot competition
in the downstream market if her rival were informed about β. The
maximization of (1) w.r.t. qM and of (2) w.r.t. qR yield the
equilibrium variables in the downstream market as a function of
β and aI
 a AI I( )β ≤ a a AI I
m
I( ) ( ),β β∈{ }
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19 This is due to the fact that it is assumed that there is common knowledge
of the functions of the model and of the cost distribution.
(6)
Substituting for (6) in the upstream monopolist’s profit
function, given by (1), and maximizing it w.r.t. aI yields the
monopoly access price
(7)
Let βm(A¯¯I) denote the value of β ∈ [β, β¯¯ ] such that: βm(A¯¯I) =
aI
m-1 (A¯¯I). Since aI
m(β) increases in β it follows that
Therefore, under ACI, the upstream monopolist has to charge
the access price cap for β ∈ [βm(A¯¯ I), β¯¯ ] while she is allowed to
charge both the monopoly access price and the access price cap
for β ∈ [β, βm(A¯¯I)]. The upstream monopolist’s choice is
determined by comparing the firm’s profits obtainable from
charging amI (β) and A¯¯I , respectively, for β ∈ [β, βm(A¯¯I)].
By charging the monopoly access price the upstream
monopolist excludes her rival from the downstream market; so
she will gain monopolistic profits in the downstream market, but
lose the access profits that she would obtain by selling at A¯¯I the
essential input to the rival. In this case, the upstream monopolist’s
profit function is given by (1) with the equilibrium outputs defined
in (6) for aI = a
m
I(β).
Let us consider the case in which the upstream monopolist
charges A¯¯I. Since the access price cap breaks the link between
access price and cost, the upstream monopolist’s rival cannot
deduce the true realization of β from the access price. Hence, it
will choose its output qR so as to maximize its expected profits
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EΠRI, with ΠRI given by (2) where the expectation is taken over β,
while the informed upstream monopolist will set her output qM
so as to maximize (1), yielding the following equilibrium outputs
(8)
The fact that at A¯¯I the upstream monopolist’s rival sets its
output on the basis of β0 makes the industrial structure in the
downstream market dependent on the value of the demand
parameter d and on the shape of the distribution function F(β).
Indeed, by using the definition of βm(A¯¯I), the rival’s output can 
be written as 20. Therefore qR(β0 A¯¯I) = 0, for 
demand and distribution functions giving β0 ≤ βm(A¯¯I) and the
upstream monopolist will gain monopolistic downstream profits as
in the case in which she charges amI(β). Instead, qR(β0 A¯¯I) > 0 for
demand and distribution functions giving β0 > βm(A¯¯I) and the
upstream monopolist will obtain Cournot profits in the downstream
market and access profits from selling the essential input to the
rival; in this case the upstream monopolist’s profit function is given
by (1) with the equilibrium outputs defined in (8).
The comparison between the profits obtainable by the
upstream monopolist from charging the monopoly access price
and those from charging the access price cap for β ∈ [β, βm(A¯¯I)]
leads to the following lemma.
LEMMA 1: Under ACI, the upstream monopolist will charge the
access price cap for all β ∈ [β, β¯¯].
According to Lemma 1 the upstream monopolist chooses to
charge the access price cap also when favorable technological
conditions make the monopoly access price lower than the access
price cap.
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20 This is obtained by substituting for in qR (.). 2 = ( )A d AI
m
I+ β
The rationale for Lemma 1 can be understood as follows. On
the one hand, for demand and distribution functions yielding β0
≤ βm(A¯¯I) her rival does not produce at A¯¯I and, therefore, the
upstream monopolist is indifferent about charging the access price
cap or the monopoly access price. On the other hand, for demand
and distribution functions yielding β0 > βm(A¯¯I), the upstream
monopolist, by charging A¯¯I, allows her rival to produce in the
downstream market. Therefore, she gains access profits from
selling the essential input to her rival, but loses downstream
profits with respect to the case in which she charges the monopoly
access price. Since for β ∈ [β, βm(A¯¯I)] the gain in access profits is
greater than the loss in downstream profits, the upstream
monopolist will find it profitable to charge the access price cap
whatever the actual value of the cost.
It is worth noticing that this result strictly depends on the
fact that the ignorant rival firm sets its output on the basis of β0
and this is greater than the output that an informed rival would
produce on the basis of the true realization of β for β ∈ [β,
βm(A¯¯I)]21.
In the rest of this paper the exposition will be restricted to
the case of β0 > βm(A¯¯I); this is not a serious limitation because, as
will be shown in the appendix, the results of the paper also hold
good in the case of β0 ≤ βm(A¯¯I)22.
When the upstream monopolist does not acquire information,
she will choose qM so as to maximize EΠMI with ΠMI defined by (1)
and her rival chooses qR so as to maximize EΠRI, with ΠRI given by
(2), where the expectations are taken with respect to β. The
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21 For the same reason the industry output, as well as the expected consumer
surplus, is greater when the upstream monopolist charges the access price cap 
rather than the monopoly access price for 
22 There is also an economic rationale for excluding the case of . 
Since, in this case, the upstream monopolist’s rival would not produce at the access
price cap, the integrated industry would become an unregulated monopoly. As a
consequence, the upstream monopolist would not be allowed to produce in the
downstream market, i.e. integration would never occur under asymmetric
information. This makes the case of irrelevant for the purpose of this
paper.  
β β0 ( )≤ m IA
 
β β0 ( )≤ m IA
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equilibrium outputs under no information acquisition are given
by
(9)
where with amI(β0) indicating the monopoly 
access price maximizing the upstream monopolist’s expected
profits. Since βm(A¯¯I) < β0 by assumption, amI(β0) > A¯¯I and thereby
an ignorant upstream monopolist will charge aNI = A¯¯I.
The above analysis has shown that the information on β
allows the upstream monopolist to adjust her output to the actual
value of the cost, while, when ignorant, she sets her output on
the expected value of the cost. Therefore, information acquisition
is socially valuable, under integration, because it increases the
variability of the industry equilibrium output which, in turn, with
linear demand, increases the expected net consumer surplus23.
2.3 Separation
This paragraph will derive Cournot equilibrium outputs and
the access price charged by the upstream monopolist under
separation. The downstream firms simultaneously choose their
output by maximizing their profit function, given by (4), w.r.t. qS
yielding:
(10)
 
q a
d a
Q a
d a
S S
S
S S
S( ( )) =
( )
3
; ( ( )) =
2 2 ( )
3
;β β β β− −
 
a A aI
N
I I
m= , ( )0min β{ }
 
q a
d a
q a
d aM
I
N I
N
R
I
N I
N
( , ) =
2
3
; ( ) =
2
0
0
0,
0β β β β+ − − +
3
;
( , ) =
2
30
0Q a
d a
I I
N I
N
β β− −
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA JANUARY-MARCH 2009
226
23 The welfare effects of information acquisition can be intuitively understood 
by realizing that the expected net consumer surplus is equal to
.
Due to linear demand, the acquisition of information does not affect the
expected equilibrium output, while it increases its variance.
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where , is the access price charged by an 
informed upstream monopolist, with amS(β) denoting the monopoly
access price and A¯¯S the access price cap. It is easy to demonstrate
that the monopoly access price under S is equal to that under I,
defined in (7). Therefore, there is a value of β, βm(A¯¯S) ∈ (β, β¯¯ )
defined by such that
which substituted in (10) yield
(11)
(12)
Notice that the information on β acquired by the upstream
monopolist can affect the downstream output only through the
monopoly access price charged to downstream firms. As a
consequence, for β ∈ [βm(A¯¯S), β¯¯ ] where the access price cap is
binding, the industry equilibrium output becomes insensitive to β.
If the upstream monopolist does not acquire information on
β, she sets the access price 
indicating the monopoly access price maximizing the upstream
monopolist’s expected profits. In what follows, as under I the
exposition will be restricted to the case in which the demand and
distribution functions are such that βm(A¯¯S) < β0; this is not a
limitation because, as shown in the appendix, all the results still
hold good when βm(A¯¯S) ≥ β0. Therefore, the access price set by an
ignorant upstream monopolist is aNS = A¯¯S leading to the equilibrium
output .
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The above analysis has shown that information acquisition
allows the upstream monopolist to charge an access price which
is lower than the access price cap for β ∈ [β , βm(.)] leading to a
greater industry output level. Therefore, information acquisition
is valuable to the regulator under separation because it makes it
possible to realize the welfare gains arising from the downward
flexibility of the access price cap. These welfare gains are greater,
the greater the probability that favorable technological conditions
make the monopoly access price lower than the price cap.
2.4 The Regulator’s Problem
In the first stage the regulator sets the access price cap A¯¯h, h
= I, S, taking into account the Cournot equilibrium output,
Qh(ah(β)), the access price ah(β) ∈ {amh(β), A¯¯h} charged by the
upstream monopolist under information acquisition and the
access price A¯¯h charged under ignorance.
Since the information acquisition on β is valuable to the
regulator both under integration and under separation the
regulator’s problem is
(P1)
(IR-IA)
(IR)
(IC-IA)
with EΠMh(β, ah(β)) and EΠMhN(β, A¯¯h) denoting the expected profits
of an informed and an ignorant upstream monopolist, respectively.
Constraint (IR – IA) ensures that the upstream monopolist
anticipates non-negative expected profits when she invests K in
information acquisition. Constraint (IR) guarantees that the
 E a K E Ah
M
h h
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upstream monopolist finds it profitable to produce after having
observed β24. Constraint (IC – IA) ensures that the firm prefers to
incur cost K in order to become informed about the realization
of β rather than remaining uninformed.
In a standard adverse selection setting where the upstream
monopolist privately observes the true realization of β at no cost,
the access price cap, denoted by a¯¯h solves (P1) disregarding
constraints (IR – IA) and (IC – IA). Since the profit function of 
the upstream monopolist decreases in , a¯¯ h
solves with 25.
The following section will analyze the incentives of the
upstream monopolist to acquire information when the access price
cap is a¯¯h; next I will investigate if the access price cap can be
modified in order that constraints (IR – IA) and (IC – IA) be
satisfied when the cost of acquiring information is greater than
the value of information for the upstream monopolist.
3. - ACI and ACS under Costly Information Acquisition
3.1 Incentives to Acquire Information under ACI
Initially, I will analyze the incentives of the upstream
monopolist to acquire information under ACI at the access price
cap a¯¯I designed by the regulator for the case in which the upstream
monopolist privately observes β at no cost.
Lemma 1 has shown that the informed upstream monopolist
chooses to charge the access price cap whatever the actual value
of the cost. As a consequence, the information acquisition does
 a aI S≤ Πh
M
ha( , ) = 0β  
β β: = (.) < 0
∂
∂ −
Πh
M
hQ
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24 The participation contraints of downstream firms are always satisfied in
equilibrium.
25 It is easy to show, from eqs (1) and (3), that ,because 
the upstream losses arising from setting an access price cap can be 
compensated by the profits obtainable by the integrated upstream monopolist in
the imperfectly competitive downstream market.
 aI < β
 a aS I= β βand ≤
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not affect the choice of the access price which is a¯¯I both if the
firm acquires information and if she does not.
Let EΠMI(β, β0, a¯¯I) denote the upstream monopolist’s expected
profits under information acquisition and EΠMIN(β, β0, a¯¯I) those
under ignorance, where ΠMI(β, β0, a¯¯I) and ΠMIN(β, β0, a¯¯I) are obtained
by substituting for (8) and (9), respectively, in (1) at A¯¯I = a
N = a¯¯I.
Then the following proposition is obtained.
PROPOSITION 1: i) Under ACI, at the access price cap a¯¯I, there 
is a value of K, denoted by KI where solves EΠMI(β, β0, a¯¯I) 
– EΠMIN(β, β0, a¯¯I) = KI such that: for all K ≤ KI the upstream
monopolist acquires information, while for all K > KI, the
upstream monopolist remains ignorant.
ii)
i.e., the upstream monopolist’s information value does not depend
on the access price cap.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Under ACI
the value of information for the upstream monopolist is given by
the profitability of adjusting her output to the actual value of β
for all β ∈ [β, β¯¯ ]. The greater the variance of the cost parameter,
the greater the increase in the profit arising from the output’s
adjustments and so the greater the gain from acquiring
information.
Besides, since the upstream monopolist charges a¯¯I regardless
whether she is informed or not, an increase in the access price
cap raises the firm’s expected profits to the same extent both when
she acquires information and when she does not. Therefore, an
increase in the access price cap has no effect on the upstream
monopolist’s information value. As a consequence, a regulator,
with the access cap as the only instrument of control, is unable
to induce the upstream monopolist to acquire information for K
> KI, as stated in the following lemma.
LEMMA 2: Under integration, the access price cap mechanism
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cannot induce information gathering on the part of the upstream
monopolist for all K > KI.
A straightforward consequence of Proposition 1 and Lemma
2 is stated in the following corollary which highlights the welfare
effects of the information acquisition problem under ACI.
COROLLARY 1: Under ACI, costly information acquisition does
not affect welfare for all K ≤ KI; it generates a welfare loss for all
K > KI due to the lack of socially valuable information and this
welfare loss is greater, the greater the variance of the cost
parameter.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 lies in the fact that
information acquisition is socially valuable because it makes the
industry output sensitive to β. When K ≤ KI, the access price cap
designed for the case of asymmetric information naturally provides
the upstream monopolist with incentives to acquire information
and so the presence of costly information acquisition does not
affect welfare.
However, when K > KI the upstream monopolist remains
ignorant and sets her output on the expected value of β; as a
consequence, the welfare gains arising from the industry output
variability are lost. Besides, the greater the cost uncertainty, the
greater the welfare gains arising from the adjustment of the output
to the actual value of the cost and thereby more is lost from the
lack of information acquisition.
3.2 Incentives to Acquire Information under ACS
This paragraph will evaluate the effects of the information
acquisition problem on the performance of the access price cap
mechanism under separation. First, I will analyze the incentives
of the upstream monopolist to acquire information on β under
ACS at the access price cap a¯¯S designed by the regulator for the
case of asymmetric information.
The expected profits of the upstream monopolist when she
acquires information are
F. STROFFOLINI
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where and are obtained by 
substituting for (11) and (12), respectively, in the upstream
monopolist’s profit function, given by (3), at .
Since the ignorant upstream monopolist charges a¯¯s, his
expected profits are
Then, by expressing the upstream monopolist’s information
value as follows (this expression is derived in Appendix)
(13)
the following proposition is obtained.
PROPOSITION 2: Under ACS at the access price cap a¯¯S, there is
a value of K, denoted by KS(a¯¯S) where KS(a¯¯S) > 0 solves EΠMS(β,
aS(β)) – EΠMSN(β, a¯¯S) = KS(a¯¯S), such that: for all K ≤ KS(a¯¯S) the
upstream monopolist acquires information, while for all K >
KS(a¯¯S), the upstream monopolist remains ignorant.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. Under
ACS the information on β has a value for the upstream monopolist
since it allows the firm to charge the monopoly access price
whenever it lies below the access price cap, i.e. for βε [β, βm(a¯¯S)].
Over this range, the firm’s information value is proportional to the
difference in output levels, for each β, when the firm acquires
information and when she remains ignorant. Indeed, the greater
the difference in output levels, the greater the increase in the
sensitivity of the profit to β arising from information acquisition
and so the greater the gain from acquiring information.
From Proposition 2 it follows that for K > KS(a¯¯S) the level of
the access price cap needs to be modified in order to satisfy the
constraints (IR – IA) and (IC – IA) in problem (P1). Under ACS
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the access price cap turns out to be an instrument for the regulator
to induce information gathering on the part of the upstream
monopolist. The same result is obtained in Iossa and Stroffolini
(2002), for the case of a natural monopoly regulated through a
price cap mechanism.
Denoting by the access price cap satisfying the constra-
ints (IR – IA) and (IC – IA) in problem (P1), the following
proposition is obtained
PROPOSITION 3: Under separation for K > KS(a¯¯S), information
acquisition can be induced by raising the access price cap
, with .
The intuition behind Proposition 3 lies in the fact that the
higher the access price cap, the higher the range of β where, by
acquiring information, the upstream monopolist can charge the
monopoly access price. This increases the expected profits
obtainable from acquiring information leaving unaffected those
obtainable under ignorance.
Let WS(K) denote the maximum value function of the expected
net consumer surplus in problem (P1) under ACS. A straight-
forward consequence of Propositions 2 and 3 is stated in the
following corollary.
COROLLARY 2: is a function of K: it is equal to 0 for 
all K ≤ KS(a¯¯S) and it is strictly negative for all K > KS(a¯¯S).
For K ≤ KS(a¯¯S) the access price cap mechanism designed for
the case of asymmetric information naturally provides the
upstream monopolist with the incentives to acquire information
and so the information acquisition problem does not affect
welfare. When K rises, the access price cap needs to be increased
to induce information acquisition; the greater K, the greater the
increase required in the access price cap and the lower the
expected net consumer surplus.
On the other hand, if the access price cap is not modified for
K > KS(a¯¯S), the upstream monopolist will prefer to remain ignorant
and charge a¯¯S whatever the realizations of β. Denoting by WNS the
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net expected consumer surplus under no information acquisition,
the following lemma is obtained.
LEMMA 3: Under ACS there is a value of K, denoted by KNS
where KNS > KS(a¯¯S) solves WS(K
N
S) – W
N
S = 0 such that for all K ≤
KNS it is optimal to induce information acquisition, while for all 
K > KNS it is not optimal to induce it.
The economic intuition behind Lemma 3 can be explained as
follows. On the one hand, inducing information acquisition makes
it possible to realize the welfare gains arising from the downward
flexibility of the access price cap mechanism. On the other hand,
inducing information acquisition is welfare costly because it
requires an increase in the access price cap which reduces the
output on the upper range of .
It is easy to show that whether or not it is optimal to induce
information acquisition depends on the value of K, on the value
of the demand parameter and on the shape of the distribution
function F(β). Indeed, the greater the value of K, the greater the
increase required in the access price cap and so the greater the
welfare cost of inducing information acquisition.
Moreover, for high values of the demand parameter d, the
range (β, βm(a¯¯S)] is more likely to be smaller than the range (βm(a¯¯S),β¯¯ ]26. Besides, for distribution functions of β sufficiently skewed
to the right, the probability that β falls in the region (β, βm(a¯¯S·)],
rather than in the region (βm(a¯¯S), β¯¯ ], is lower. Both these effects
reduce the probability that an informed upstream monopolist
charges an access price which is lower than the access price cap;
this, in turn, reduces the expected welfare gains arising from
information acquisition.
The above analysis suggests that in sectors where the social
value of the service offered is high and where the distribution
function of the upstream cost realizations is sufficiently skewed
to the right, the less likely it is that inducing information
acquisition will be optimal.
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26 This arises from . βm Sa d(.) = 2 −
3.3 Welfare Comparison between Integration and Separation
In the light of the above analysis, this paragraph will study
how the information acquisition problem affects the welfare
comparison between integration and separation under an access
price cap mechanism.
The following proposition compares the incentives to acquire
information under ACI and ACS at the access prices cap a¯¯ I ≤ a¯¯S
designed for the case in which the upstream monopolist privately
observes β at no cost.
PROPOSITION 4: KI > KS(a¯¯S), i.e., the incentives to acquire
information under ACI are greater than under ACS.
The rationale for Proposition 4 can be understood by noticing
(from (13) and (16)) that the gain from information acquisition
is proportional to how sensitive the industry output is to the cost
and this sensitivity is greater under integration than under
separation for each value of the cost. Indeed, under I, the
information on β is used by the upstream monopolist to adjust
her output accordingly, whatever the value of β ∈ [β, β¯¯ ].
Instead, when the upstream monopolist is excluded from the
downstream market, the industry output can adjust to β only
through the monopoly access price charged to downstream firms,
i.e. only for β ∈ [β, βm(a¯¯S)] where the monopoly access price lies
below the access price cap. Moreover, for β ∈ [β, βm(a¯¯S)] the
sensitivity of the industry output under S is lower than under I.
This is because, while under separation the output of both
downstream firms adjust to β, under integration only the upstream
monopolist’s output adjusts to β, as the information is private.
The above analysis leads to the following proposition27.
PROPOSITION 5: Costly information acquisition does not affect
the welfare comparison between integration and separation for K
≤ KS(a¯¯S); it generates a bias against separation for K ∈ (KS(a¯¯S),
KI] and this bias is non-decreasing in K for K ∈ (KS(a¯¯S), KI] and
it is increasing in K for .
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27 This result also holds in the case in which the welfare function is an
unweighted sum of consumer surplus and firms’profits. The proof is available to
an interested reader.
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The rationale for Proposition 5 can be understood as follows.
First, since the information has a value for the upstream
monopolist both under ACI and under ACS, there is no need to
modify the level of the access cap to induce information
acquisition for all K ≤ KS(a¯¯S). However, as the information is more
valuable to the upstream monopolist under ACI than under ACS,
inducing information acquisition introduces an inefficiency under
S and not under I when K ∈ (KS(a¯¯S), KI]. This inefficiency
increases in K for all K ∈ (KS(a¯¯S), K
N
S)] where it is optimal to indu-
ce information acquisition under S.
Moreover, from Corollary 1, it has been shown that for K > KI
a welfare loss arises under I as well, due to the lack of socially
valuable information acquisition. Therefore, if KNS ≤ KI the information
acquisition problem favours integration for all K ≤ KNS while if K
N
S >
KI no clear cut results can be obtained for K ∈ (KI, K
N
S].
It follows that the information acquisition problem is more
likely to increase the welfare desirability of integration, the lower
the value of KNS, i.e. whenever inducing information acquisition
under separation is unlikely to be optimal. As the discussion
following Lemma 3 has highlighted, this is more likely to occur
in network industries characterized by high social values of output
and sufficiently right-skewed distribution functions of the
upstream cost. The first condition refers to industries where the
losses arising from the interruptability of the service are socially
relevant, as in the case of the universal service obligation. The
second condition refers to cases where the probability of cost-
reducing technological changes is greater when the cost is high
than when the cost is low. Intuitively, this is likely to characterize
sectors with very complex technology, exhibiting a form of
decreasing return to scale, where the greater the number of
realized technological improvements, the lower the probability of
realizing other improvements.
I argue that the other cases, namely the network industries
characterized by low social values of output and left-skewed
distribution functions, are not worth considering. This can be
explained as follows. Consider low values of the demand
parameter and left-skewed distribution functions giving β0 ≤
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βm(a¯¯ I). In this case, as shown in section 2, the rival of the
upstream monopolist in the downstream market would not
produce at the access price cap. Therefore, a regulator, with the
access price cap as the only instrument, would not be able to limit
the profit-maximizing behavior of an integrated upstream
monopolist whatever the actual value of the cost, namely, an
integrated industry would become an unregulated monopoly. In
these network industries the only way to affect the upstream
monopolist’s strategy would be to exclude the firm from the
downstream market, i.e., integration would never occur under
asymmetric information.
The following corollary summarizes the above results.
COROLLARY 3: In network industries where the access price cap
mechanism, under asymmetric information, is effective in
regulating an integrated upstream monopolist, the information
acquisition problem is likely to increase the welfare desirability of
integration.
Finally, the following lemma evaluates the two industrial
structures when K > max {KI, K
N
S}, where there is no information
acquisition on β both under integration and separation.
LEMMA 4: Integration is welfare preferable to separation when
no information acquisition occurs.
The economic intuition of Lemma 4 lies in the fact that under
ignorance the downstream output is not sensitive to β and the
only difference between downstream outputs under I and S is due
to the expected production costs. Now the production cost is
greater under separation than under integration for two reasons.
First, because the access price cap, which is the access price
charged under ignorance, is strictly higher under S than under I,
being for all K > KS(a¯¯S) and a¯¯ I ≤ a¯¯S. This makes the 
production cost of downstream firms under S greater than the
cost of the upstream monopolist’s rival under I. Second, because
the ignorant upstream monopolist sets its output on β0 which is
lower than a¯¯ I. Both these effects lead to a greater output when
the ignorant upstream monopolist is allowed to produce in the
downstream market, as under I, than when she is excluded, as
under S.
 a aS S≥
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4. - Conclusions
In this paper I have investigated the desirability of allowing
an upstream monopolist, regulated through an access price cap
mechanism, to produce in the downstream market as opposed to
excluding her, in the presence of costly and socially valuable
information on the upstream cost. I have shown that the
information acquisition problem provides an argument in favour
of vertical integration. In the case of high information acquisition
costs, this is more likely to occur in network industries
characterized by universal service obligation and complex techno-
logies exhibiting some form of decreasing returns of scale.
A straightforward extension of this paper is to investigate the
welfare desirability of integration when the acquisition of
information concerns an uncertain demand in the downstream
market.
Another line of research is to evaluate the performance of
other forms of partial regulation when there is a problem of
acquiring socially valuable information on uncertain demand
and/or cost functions. One form of partial regulation is the global
price cap (Laffont and Tirole,1996) which regulates the upstream
monopolist in both markets, but introduces flexibility in the price
structure by applying a single price-cap index to both the end-user
services and the essential input provided to downstream
competitors. The supporters of this mechanism have shown that
it can lead to efficient prices when the regulator can forecast the
true quantities corresponding to the prices that will be set by the
firm, and uses these quantities to weight the corresponding price
in the cap. However, in the context of an unstable and unknown
demand function more realistic weights are used, such as the past
quantities produced by the firms. An interesting issue to investigate
is how the upstream monopolist’s incentives to acquire information
on uncertain demand and/or cost are affected by the type of
variables chosen as weights in the global cap and by the tightness
of the cap.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA (1): The profit function of the upstream
monopolist who charges the monopoly access price is
(14)
and when she charges A¯¯I is
(15)
Taking the difference between (15) and (14) and substituting
for d = 2A¯¯I – βm, easy calculations yield
Since
and
it follows that for all .
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION (1): i) First show that the constraint (IC
– IA) is satisfied. Since by using Taylor’s
expansion
(16)
Second, since the constraint 
(IR – IA) is satisfied as (IR) and (IC – IA) hold.
Using the same procedure it is easy to show that the same
result is obtained in the case of β0 ≤ βm(a¯¯I) where the upstream
monopolist’s profit function under information acquisition is
ΠMI(β) defined in (14) and aNI = amI(β0).
ii) Easy calculations give
PROOF OF COROLLARY (1): Substituting for (8) in (5) gives the
expected net consumer surplus under information acquisition
(17)
while the expected consumer surplus under ignorance is
(18)
with QI(β0, a¯¯I) defined in (9) at aN = a¯¯I.
Taking the difference between (17) and (18) and using Taylor’s
expansion, gets
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION (2): First show that the constraint 
(IC–IA) is satisfied. Notice that for all β ≤ βm(a¯¯s)
and for all .
Integrating yields
(19)
since at 
Integrating yields 
and substituting for (19) gives
(20)
Applying the same procedure is obtained
(21)
Taking the expectation of (20) and (21) yields
(22)
Applying the same procedure
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(23)
Taking the difference between (22) and (23) and integrating
by parts gives
which, by using (11) and (12) and substituting for d = 2a¯¯S – βm,
becomes
(24)
Second, since the constraint (IR – IA) 
is satisfied as (IR) and (IC – IA) hold. Similar results are obtained
when aNS = a
m
S(β0) since for all β ≠ β0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION (3): Let’s consider (24) evaluated at .
Differentiating it with respect to gives
(25)
By implicitly differentiating the constraint (IC – IA), the result
follows
(26)
PROOF OF COROLLARY (2): Notice that
(27)
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where A¯¯S = a¯¯S and for ; and
for . Therefore, for 
and
for where
and is given in (26).
PROOF OF LEMMA (3): Let
(28)
with defined in (12) for . Taking the difference
between (27) and (28) leads
where and with
for all and
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION (4): The proof is made for the case
and . It holds also for , being
. By using (24), it is easy to show that sufficient 
condition for is
(29)
Integrating by part the first term yields
with and defined in (8) and (9), respec-
tively, for . Since the first term is positive, it is easy
to show that the inequality in expression (29) is satisfied if
which is true being βm(.) < β0.
The result a fortiori holds for where , 
h = I, S. Indeed, KI does not change, while KS(a¯¯S) decreases, being 
for .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION (5): From Corollary 2 and Lemma 3
dWS(K)/dK = 0 for all for all 
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and for all . Since, from Corollary 1 the
information acquisition problem does not affect welfare under ACI
for all K ≤ KI and from Proposition 4 , the result
follows.
PROOF OF LEMMA (4): Taking the difference between (18) and
(28) yields
since . Similar result is obtained in the case of
β0 < βm(.) where . a a I Sh
N
h
m= ( )0β , ,h =
 a aI S+ β0 < 2
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